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Abstract. Information security is concerned with protecting the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems. System man-
agers deploy their resources with the aim of maintaining target levels of
these attributes in the presence of reactive threats. Information stew-
ardship is the challenge of maintaining the sustainability and resilience
of the security attributes of (complex, interconnected, multi-agent) in-
formation ecosystems. In this paper, we present, in the tradition public
economics, a model of stewardship which addresses directly the ques-
tion of resilience. We model attacker-target-steward behaviour in a fully
endogenous Nash equilibrium setting. We analyse the occurrence of ex-
ternalities across targets and assess the steward’s ability to internalize
these externalities under varying informational assumptions. We apply
and simulate this model in the case of a critical national infrastructure
example.
1 Introduction
The objective of information security managers is to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information systems for which they are respon-
sible, by adjusting their adopted security measures in response to the evolving
threat environment. The optimal investment in such security measures has been
studied initially by Gordon and Loeb [8].
The dynamic responses of information security managers to evolving threats
to confidentiality, integrity, and availability have been modelled by, among oth-
ers, Ioannidis, Pym, and Williams [10], August, and Tunca [3] and Arora, Telang
and Xu [1].
This objective must be pursued in the context of an information ecosystem
that is subject to finite degradation of performance because of internal and
external influences. In the information ecosystem, threats to the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of individual components of the ecosystem can be
transmitted to others, impacting negatively on their security status. In such an
environment, the role of the information steward is to maintain the sustainability
and resilience of the ecosystem’s nominal operating capacity, so delivering the
managers’ desired levels of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
1.1 Sustainability
By the sustainability of a system, subject to finite degradation caused by a
persistent stream of attacks, we mean its tendency to remain within specified
levels of nominal operating capacity. The graph in Figure 1 depicts this concept
in static framework.
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Fig. 1. The concept of sustainability in information stewardship.
During successive tenures, stewards adopt policies to extend the system’s
lifetime. This is illustrated in Figure 2, in which interventions by the steward
can be seen to maintain the system within its intended operating zone. From a
game-theoretic point of view, managing the ecosystem to achieve this objective
is a mechanism design problem for the steward.
In a recent paper, Ioannidis, Pym, and Williams [10] have explored the stew-
ard’s responses to maintain sustainability in the presence of endogenous attacks.
They show that the presence of the steward increases investment in information
security and, more importantly, reduces the number of attacks, thus retarding
system degradation.
1.2 Resilience
In addition to the persistent stream of attacks to which a system is regularly
subjected, occasionally the impact of an attack will be such that the system
diverges from its predefined operational bounds. By resilience, we mean the
ability of the system to return its operating capacity to within the specified
bounds. Our notion of resilience is consistent with that discussed in [9, 15].
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Fig. 2. A multi-stage sustainability problem with periodic technology resets.
The steward seeks to minimize, subject to a range of endogenous constraints,
the time for which the system operates outside of the specified operating limits.
Figure 3 depicts the concept of resilience in static framework in the presence
of the information steward.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in § 2, we present a
model of resilience, with and without the information steward, with varying
degrees of influence over the inhabitants of the ecosystem; in § 3, we present a
detailed example of the model, illustrated by simulations, and informed by the
operations of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs); finally, § 4 provides a summary
of our contribution and some directions for future research.
2 The Model
We have argued that the challenge for the information steward is to maintain
the sustainability and resilience of target levels of confidentiality, availability,
integrity, and investment for information ecosystems operating in potentially
hostile environments. In previous work [13] and [10], we have shown how to model
sustainability, placing our discussion in the broader context of stewardship. We
now extend our treatment of sustainability to account for resilience.
This extension is not merely incremental. Rather, it introduces significant
additional and conceptual challenges.
A key feature of our account of resilience is that we illustrate how thresh-
olds for the effectiveness of stewards emerge from the underlying model of the
response of information ecosystems to the hostility of the environment.4
4 Note by that the hostility of the environment we mean a representation of the ca-
pacity of attackers rather than simply the success or failure of an individual attack.
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Fig. 3. The concept of resilience in information stewardship.
As in our previous work on sustainability [10], our approach is one of mecha-
nism design in which the targets of attacks are expected-loss-minimizers, subject
to diminishing marginal returns on security investment. Similarly, attackers are
modelled as rational agents. They are assumed to have utility functions, with
well defined preferences, which can be used to capture their behavioural choices
with respect to a variety of consumption goods, which maybe converted to mon-
etary certainty equivalents, gained from successful attacks. We consider a set of
NT ex-ante identical targets choosing to allocate defensive resources that mit-
igate the harm from attacks. In a departure from previous models, the targets
need to solve, simultaneously, a multi-dimensional resource allocation problem.
Let the subscripts h and l represent to potential areas of allocation of assets,
where h and l denote the areas of high and low security where information assets
are held, and let xh ≥ 0 and xl ≥ 0 denote the one-off investments made at time
t0 in securing assets located in the corresponding areas. Finally, we define z to
be a switching variable such that a fraction, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1, of assets is allocated
between h and l.
Our model depends crucially on two key (vector) parameters. First, we con-
sider the elasticity of attacking intensity denoted by the vector α. This is the
parameter that captures the marginal effectiveness of an additional attacker per
target (η) entering the ecosystem. Whilst, in general, one would consider an
ecosystem of participants having n types of assets of interest, without loss of
representation of resilience, our model restricts is limited to two types of assets.
In this case, we need to consider just two elasticities, αl and αh with corre-
sponding ηl and ηh, which are associated with low and high levels of difficulty in
securing assets. Second, we consider parameters ψl and ψh, which capture the
relative rate of risk reduction for additional security investments by targets in
each asset class (xl and xh).
Let σ˜i∈{l,h} : R+ → [0, 1] be a function that determines the instantaneous
time t risk for a fixed time-horizon, where (t0, T ) = {t | t0 < t < T}. When
properly specified we can interpret σ˜ as the instantenous probability of a suc-
cessful attack. We refer to z as the ‘asset allocation’ and the quantities xl and
xl as the ‘investment allocation’, stated combinations of all three are referred as
‘allocation bundles’.
Our assumption is that increased investment xi∈{l,h} reduces the probability
of a successful attack; that is, ∂σ˜i∈{l,h}/∂xi∈{l,h} < 0, ceteris paribus. However,
along with increasing investment there is a decreasing marginal reduction in
the probability of a successful attack, ∂2σ˜i∈{l,h}/∂x2i∈{l,h} > 0. Similarly, with
increased attacking intensity ηi∈{l,h} on the particular area of allocation there
should be a corresponding increase in the probability of a successful attack,
∂σ˜i∈{l,h}/∂ηi∈{l,h} > 0.
A functional form for σ˜ that satisfies these conditions is the following multi-
plicative model:
σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , i ∈ {l, h}. (1)
Under this formulation, there is an upper bound on ηi∈{l,h} of η∗i < e
α−1i xiψi ,
for i ∈ {l, h}, such that σ˜i may still be interpreted as probability of a successful
attack. Here ψi∈{l,h} is the relative marginal decrease in σ˜i,i∈{l,h} for a unit
increase in xi∈{l,h} whilst αi∈{l,h} is the elasticity of attack.
In this model, we assume that attacker externalities are driven by the diffuse-
attacking-mass approach first suggested in [13] and refined in [10]. In this ap-
proach attackers are assumed to be ex-ante identical and randomly allocated
to targets with identical probability 1/NT . Attackers are assumed to be able to
make independent decisions on the type of attacks. A useful interpretation of the
attacker cost per unit is that attackers need to develop an attacking tool at cost c
each time they engage a target. The attacker then chooses the medium by which
it seeks to monetize its attacking effort (in the case of terrorists, for example,
monetization is via utility equivalents). An example could be corporate network
information channels versus industrial control systems. Attackers, at inception,
may not know which target they intend to attack. From the viewpoint of the
steward in this setting, it is irrelevant who is attacking the targets. From the
target-attacker transaction point of view, the salient point is the aggregate level
of loss incurred in the presence of attacking intent.
Let the number of attackers for each asset area be NA,i∈{l,h}. The ratio of
attackers per target is the attacking intensity ηi∈{l,h} = NA,i∈{l,h}/NT . Let the
reward R > 0 for a successful attack be proportional to the assets allocated in
each area, h and l, and for notational simplicity let ζi=l = z and ζi=h = 1 − z.
Set γ = c/R to be the cost ratio of attack, where c is the unit cost of a single
attack. When the attacker’s time preference is described by δ, the profit function
for a single attacker is
Π˜A,i =
T∫
t0
e−δtζiη−1i σ˜i (xi, ηi) dt− γ, i ∈ {l, h}. (2)
We assume that attackers do not coordinate attacks (or are commissioned by
a single attacker) and rewards are claimed on a first-winner-takes-all basis. At-
tackers are assumed to be drawn from a pool and make one-off entry decisions
until marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal and hence Π˜A,i = 0.
For the targets of such attacks, let L > 0 be an instantaneous value of assets
at risk from attack and β ∈ R be a subjective discount rate determining the time
preferences of all targets. The risk neutral expected loss over the time horizon
t0 < t < T , is given by
V˜L =
T∫
t0
e−βt (zσ˜l (xl, ηl)L+ (1− z) σ˜h (xh, ηh)L) dt+ xl + xh. (3)
The optimal allocation bundle (z, xl , x

h), when attacking intensity is exoge-
nous, is the simultaneous solution of {∂V˜L/∂xl = 0, ∂V˜L/∂xh = 0, ∂V˜L/∂z = 0}.
By construction, if αi∈{l,h} > 0, ψi∈{l,h} > 0, L > 0, β > 0 and z ∈ (0, 1), a min-
imum of this function exists. By assumption we set that the optimal allocation
must be either (xi∈{k,h}) ∈ R+ when (ηi∈{k,h}) ∈ R+ or, if the minimum lies at
xi∈{l,h} < 0, then xi∈{l,h} = 0. Similarly, we impose the inequality constraint
that 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
Assuming that targets and attackers have positive discount rates the appro-
priate time horizon, T , for empirical analysis, maybe determined endogenously.
Let λ be an arbitrarily large, but not infinite, number. For a given discount rate,
θ˜ = min(δ, β), by construction
limT→∞
∫ T
t0
θ˜−1e−θtdt = 1.
Therefore, the approximation of the time horizon T˜ covering the 1 − 1/λ pro-
portion of the future losses is derived from T˜ = log(λ)/θ˜. In §(3) of this paper,
we follow [10] and assume that β > δ and T˜ = log(λ)/δ, such that the interval t0
to T˜ covers 90% of the expected present value; that is, λ = 10.
What is important, to the steward, is the overall mass of attacks against
systems containing assets under the types l and h ’storage/operations’ areas
and this will be influenced by the aggregate behaviour of targets and attackers,
rather than the microstructure of individual attack-defence interactions. The
more attractive the ecosystem is to attackers, the greater the mass of attacks
against its individual components.
Proposition 1 (Existence of Nash Equilibria Without the Stewart).
1. (Equilibrium Target Investment) Under the preceding assumptions, when
σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , for i ∈ {l, h}, the Nash equilibrium allocations of xh, xl
and z denoted x∗h, x
∗
l and z∗ are
x∗i =
αi
ψi
log
(
Lψiψ
2
j
(
eδT − 1)2
γδβ(ψj + ψi)
2
)
− αiδT
ψi
, i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {l, h}, j 6= i
z∗ =
ψl
ψh + ψl
. (4)
2. (Equilibrium Attacker Intensity) Following from Part 1, above, the Nash
equilibrium attacker intensities, denoted η∗l and η
∗
h are
η∗i =
(
ψj(e
δT − 1)e−x∗iψi−δT
γδ(ψi + ψj)
) 1
1−αl
, i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {l, h}, j 6= i, (5)
where x∗i,∈{l,h}, is the functional forms of the Nash equilibrium given in
Part 1 (above).
Proof. The proofs of Parts 1 and 2 are given in Appendix A.1. Note that in the
multiplicative separably additive form of σ˜i∈{l,h} the Nash equilibrium allocation
z∗ is a simple function of ψi∈{l,h} and when ψl = ψh the allocation is equal. If
we add the constraint xl + xh = x˜, where x˜ is a binding budget constraint, then
the attacking effort in each asset area enters the solution for z. uunionsq
We demonstrate that, in this modelling approach, we do not have to impose
an arbitrary constraint on xl + xh, to create conditions similar to the standard
results obtained when optimizing under such budget restrictions.
2.1 Introducing the Steward
The subject of this paper is resilience, and why a system might not be resilient
to security shocks through the choices of the individual components. The first
stewardship action we evaluate replicates our previous work (on sustainability
[10]) by postulating a Stackelberg policy framework in which the policy-maker
stewarding the system sets rules relative to a target level of sustainability. When
the steward is fully informed, our model reverts to the mechanism design problem
discussed in [10], in which the steward is able to set a mandatory investment
bundle (denoted by the lower bar) on the individual targets (x¯l, x¯h), as well as
imposing a specific asset allocation z¯.
The Nash equilibrium allocations for the NT targets assumes no social co-
ordination. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium allocation (x∗l , x
∗
h, z
∗) of defensive
effort and corresponding attacking intensities (η∗l , η
∗
h) will not necessarily be the
first best solution for Pareto efficiency. Let (x†l , x
†
h, z
†) be the Pareto efficient
allocations for a given set of model parameters (αi∈{l,h}, β, γ, δ, λ, , ψi∈{l,h}, L).
A classical efficiency model, with the steward acting as a public policy-maker
and imposing (x¯l, x¯h, z¯) [10], demonstrates that Pareto efficiency guarantied only
when the subjective discount rate of the steward is equal to β, the common
discount rate. Indeed, the analysis in [10] illustrates that, from the subjective
viewpoint described by targets’ heterogeneous discount rates, the chosen values
of (x¯l, x¯h, z¯) cannot always be a Pareto efficient allocation, (x
†
l , x
†
h, z
†), when
β 6= β¯. However, there may exist constellations of parameters such the welfare
of the individual agents have improved due to the presence of the steward de-
spite their different discount rates. In this study, we do not explore such welfare
comparisons.
2.2 The Fully Informed (xl, xh, z)-setting Steward
Let the steward’s discount rate be β¯. A fully informed steward sets a mandatory
level of (x¯l, x¯h, z¯) by minimizing the following loss function
V˜P =
T∫
t0
e−β¯t
(
zσ˜l
(
xl, η
♦
l
)
L+ (1− z) σ˜h
(
xh, η
♦
h
)
L
)
dt+ xl + xh, (6)
where η♦i (xi, z) for i ∈ {l, h} is the solution to
T∫
t0
e−δtζiη−1i σ˜i (xi, ηi) dt = γ, i ∈ {l, h}, (7)
in terms of (xl, xh, z). We can see that, by internalizing the attacker reaction
curve, the fully informed policy-maker with identical time preferences to the
homogenous targets β¯ = β will set an allocation bundle (x¯l, x¯h, z¯). Moreover, in
[10], we show that for the one-dimensional investment case the allocation will be
the Pareto efficient allocation from the point of view of both the steward and
targets.
In the multi-allocation form of the model, where σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , for i ∈ {l, h},
proof that (x¯l, x¯h, z¯) = (x
†
l , x
†
h, z
†), when β¯ = β for all parameter combinations,
is not possible because z¯ does not have a closed form solution (other than in
certain special cases; e.g., αl = αh = α). One such case is to consider a constraint
on weighting aspect of the bundle z across asset areas of the form: z = ψh/(ψh+
ψl), the Nash equilibrium allocation. Other constraints on z can be reasonably
justified, as we subsequently demonstrate.
Proposition 2 (The Fully Informed Steward).
1. (Target investment with steward) When σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii and z¯ = ψh/(ψh +
ψl), the stewards optimal investment allocation (x¯l, x¯h) is
x¯i =
1
ψi
log
(
ψj(ψi + ψj)
1
1−αj
)
+
αi
ψi
log
(
1
γ
δ
(
eδT − 1))+(
β¯T (αi − 1)
ψi
− δTαi
ψi
)
+
(αi − 1)
ψi
log
(
−β¯ (αj − 1)
Lψi
(
eβ¯T − 1)
)
,
i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {l, h}, j 6= i (8)
2. (Attacking intensity) Following from Part 1, above, the attacker intensity
ηi∈{l,h} is
η¯i =
(
ψi
(
eδT − 1) e−x¯iψi−δT
γδ (ψj + ψi)
) 1
1−αi
, i ∈ {l, h}, j ∈ {l, h}, j 6= i (9)
where x¯i is given in Equation 8.
Proof. The proofs of Parts 1 and 2 are given in Appendix A.2. The solution is
again subject to an upper bound of η∗i < e
α−1i xiψi , for i ∈ {l, h}. We can compare
the solutions in Equations 8 and 9 for the fully informed steward versus those
in Equations 4 and 5. uunionsq
Proposition 3 (The Steward’s Improvement). If σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , with β ≥
β¯, and αi∈{l,h} > 0, ψi∈{l,h} > 0, γ > 0, δ > 0, L > 0 and the asset allocation
is constrained to z¯ = ψh/(ψh + ψl), then the steward’s mandated investment
x¯i∈{l,h} is always greater than or equal to the Nash equilibrium investment bundle
x∗i∈{l,h}.
Proof. The proof is obtained by substituting the expressions x¯i∈{l,h} and x∗i∈{l,h}
in Equations 4 and 8 into the functional form x¯i∈{l,h} ≥ x∗i∈{l,h} and subject
to the constraint β ≥ β¯. By solving the two inequalities simultaneously for each
parameter relative to its own constraint, that is αi∈{l,h} > 0, ψi∈{l,h} > 0, γ >
0, δ > 0, L > 0, by inspection the constraint β > β¯ is never violated. The
complete set of steps of the proof is relatively simple, albeit long algebraic ma-
nipulation. uunionsq
A useful by-product of the comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 is that
we can define an upper bound on β ≥ β¯ such that the steward does at least as
well as the Nash equilibrium even when the steward weights potential near-term
losses more than the targets do). Again, this is covered in more detail for the
one-dimensional case in [10].
The attacker intensities follow from the functional form of the Nash equilib-
rium, except with x¯i∈{l,h} replacing x∗i∈{l,h}, as in Equation 9. From the chosen
functional form of σ˜i∈{l,h}, η¯i∈{|,h}, we know that overall loss decreases with
increasing xi∈{l,h}, ceteris paribus, and we know, by construction, that x¯ > x∗
when we constrain using z¯ = ψh/(ψh + ψl) and β ≥ β¯.
Following [10], we also consider an non-discounted metric V˜A that measures
total cost from attacks and investment. We consider a detailed functional form
in § 2.6. If xi∈{l,h} is set by the fully informed steward minimizing the objective
function set out in Equation 6 and if σ˜i∈{l,h}, η¯i∈{|,h}, with z¯ = ψh/(ψh+ψl) and
β ≥ β¯, then V˜A(x¯i∈{l,h}) will be lower than V˜A(x¯∗i∈{l,h}) for all combinations of
αi∈{l,h} > 0, ψi∈{l,h} > 0, γ > 0, δ > 0 and L > 0. Although, by construction, V˜A
is not an objective function (its minima is unbounded in xi∈{l,h}), the functional
form of V˜A is useful in measuring the effect of the transition from x
∗
i∈{l,h} to
x¯i∈{l,h} free from the subjective discount rates β and β¯.
2.3 Reducing the Steward’s Abilities
The preceding notion of the steward assumed that it has the ability to impose
(x¯l, x¯h, z¯) on the targets and thus achieve a lower loss in V˜P than the Nash
equilibrium allocation of (x∗l , x
∗
h, z
∗). This result is useful, if unsurprising. The
steward acts as a classic public policy-maker and sets the mechanism so that
any attacking externalities are internalised by the targets. A less intuitive fact is
that it is the steward’s discount rate β¯ that determines if, from the viewpoint of
the targets with discount rate β, a Pareto efficient solution has been achieved.
For some parameter combinations of α and ψ, with β 6= β¯, a natural tension
will exist between the targets and the steward. If the steward requires, period-
ically, say, to have its power to set (x¯l, x¯h, z¯) ratified by the targets, then it is
likely that β¯ → β. However, if the individual targets have heterogeneous discount
rates, then the steward will never be able to attain the Pareto dominant solution
unless each target is allowed to state its own discount rate. When this issue oc-
curs, targets may overstate their discount rates — we can consider the security
resource allocation to be part of a wider investment bundle for the targets —
and their allocation bundles will simply tend back to the Nash equilibrium. We
leave extended discussion of this effect to future work.
Moving back to the simplified ex-ante identical targets example, further in-
teresting cases can be analysed by restricting either the action set and/or the
information set of the steward. Indeed, these cases present the type of situations
where the steward is unable to maintain the resilience of the ecosystem of tar-
gets in the presence of shocks to specific parameters (we focus on shocks to the
technology parameters αi∈{l,h} and ψi∈{l,h}). In the next section, we analyse the
cases of the fully informed steward with limited action and, finally, the partially
informed steward with limited action.
2.4 Full Information with Limited Action: Majority and Minority
Cases
First, consider the case in which the steward can observe xi∈{l,h} and z, but can
only impose constraints on xh and z. We designate this the majority-action-case;
that is, the steward controls the majority of variables affecting the allocation
bundle (two variables) and the individual agents control a minority of it (one
variable).
A similar case occurs when the the steward can only impose constraints on
xh and xl, but observes z, the results are intuitively identical. In this case for
the targets of attacks, xh and z are now exogenous and their problem reduces
to a one-dimensional optimization problem seeking to minimize
x˜l(z, xh, ηl, ηh) =
arg min
xl
T∫
t0
e−βt (zσ˜l (xl, ηl)L+ (1− z)σ˜h (x¯h, ηh)L) dt+ xl + xh, (10)
where x˜l(z, xh, ηl, ηh) is the target’s optimal solution for xl as a function of the
now imposed values of xh, z, and the attacker intensity choices ηl and ηh. The in-
tuition behind this approach is that the steward sets some collection of rules that
identify the allocation z and then imposes some investment on that allocation
xh. The optimal bundle of (xh, z) from the viewpoint of the steward is denoted
(x¯h, z¯). The steward therefore solves the other two thirds of the allocation using
the following objective function:
(x¯h, z¯) =
arg min
xh,z
T∫
t0
e−β¯t
(
(1− z)σ˜l
(
x˜l
(
z, xh, η
♦
l , η
♦
h
)
, η♦l
)
L+ zσ˜h
(
xh, η
♦
h
)
L
)
dt
+x˜l
(
z, xh, η
♦
l , η
♦
h
)
+ xh, (11)
where ηi∈{l,h} is the solution to the attacker intensities given in Equation 7 As
the steward anticipates the reaction of the target into the objective function for
xl, in this instance, almost all of the steward’s objectives in (xl, xh, z) can be
achieved. The the steward can impose itself on two out of the three degrees of
freedom in the model. We can also see that if β¯ = β (i.e., when the steward
and targets have aligned time preferences), then the steward will achieve a risk
profile broadly similar to the case when the steward controls all of the degrees
of freedom (xl, xh, z). Whilst the steward can attain its desired risk expenditure
trade-off, it can do so only at a lower level of efficiency (in terms of total initial
cost xl + xh) than if the steward controls (xl, xh, z). Unless an arbitrary upper
bound is placed on xh + xl, the steward can achieve a global minimum, for
any given combination of αi∈{l,h} and ψi∈{l,h}, by imposing a shift of assets (if
necessary) into the high security domain. In the extreme case, in which z¯ → 1,
the steward has control over all assets and sets an unbounded investment in
protection of x¯h as an essentially one-dimensional optimization problem.
Reducing the steward’s action space to only one of the three allocation vari-
ables (which we call the minority action case) provides a far greater limitation to
its action space and substantially impairs the steward’s ability to internalize the
attacker externalities and adjust the total level of risk in response to a change
in αi∈{l,h} or ψi∈{l,h}. However, the circumstances in which a steward would
be able to observe behaviour, but have no direct influence on it, violate one of
the presumed key roles of the steward in the ecosystem leave the motivation and
analysis of this fully informed, but substantively limited, steward to future work.
2.5 The Partially Informed Steward with Limited Action: Minority
Case
We skip case of the fully informed steward with limited action and move directly
to a partially informed steward with minority action. This, in theory at least, is
the most interesting case as it illustrates both the limitations of the steward’s
actions in response to changes in αi∈{l,h} or ψi∈{l,h} and also that, with lim-
ited information, the presence of the steward can in fact lead to a worse global
outcome than the Nash equilibrium .
Let the steward observe and enforce only xh. The steward can observe and
internalize the externality in ηh, but cannot observe or enforce z or xl. The
targets then choose the investment and allocation bundle (xl, z) following
(x˜l, z˜;xh, ηl, ηh) =
arg min
xl,z
T∫
t0
e−βt (z¯σ˜l (xl, ηl)L+ (1− z¯)σ˜h (x¯h, ηh)L) dt+ xl + xh. (12)
The steward now solves the following minority optimization, with the steward’s
given information set:
x¯h(ηh) = arg min
xh
T∫
t0
e−βt
(
Lˆσ˜h
(
x¯h, η
♦
h
))
dt+ xh, (13)
where η♦h is the solution to the attacker entry problem from Equation 2, but
only for the h asset class.
From the steward’s point of view this is now
T∫
t0
e−δtζ˜hη−1h σ˜h (xh, ηh) dt = γ. (14)
Note that the steward now takes for given Lˆ as the value of losses; this is because
the steward can no longer identify zL and (1− z)L, the steward is simply given
Lˆ by the targets at an a-priori stage and is assumed to be exogenous. Similarly,
whilst ζ˜h is equal to z from the viewpoint of attackers and targets, it is simply a
parameter unrelated to the overall asset allocation of the targets from the point
of view of the steward. The steward is now unwittingly, not a Stackelberg policy
maker, but in a Nash equilibrium with the targets and attackers.
The attackers are also solving their entry and exit decision for assets in
allocation l, following
∫ T
t0
e−δtζ˜lη−1l σ˜l (xl, ηl) dt = γ. This is unobserved by the
steward, but is accounted for as part of a Nash equilibrium by the targets.
For tractability, we assume that, from the viewpoint of the attackers, ζ˜h is set
exogenously and at a fixed ratio to Lˆ. We are interested in the reaction of targets
setting xl and attackers choosing ηl, in order to demonstrate the natural limits
that appear in the game and to analyse this case, we assume without loss of
generality that Lˆ is exogenous by construction and ζ˜h is already set in a pre-
optimization between the attackers and the steward.
Proposition 4 (Attackers and Steward).
1. (Asset Class h) If σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , for i ∈ {l, h}, the steward’s objective
function is as stated in Equation 13, and the attacker dynamics are as given
in Equation 14, then the steward’s optimal mandated investment allocation
is
x¯h =
1− αh
ψh
log(Lˆ(ebT − 1)ψh)− αh
ψh
log(γδ(ζ˜eδT − ζ˜))
1
ψh
(log(β¯αh − β¯)(1− αh) + αhT (β¯ − δ)− β¯T ). (15)
Following from the steward’s choice, the attacker intensity, given the stew-
ard’s actions η¯h, is given by
η¯h =
(
ζ˜
(
eδT − 1) e−x¯hψh−δT
γδ
) 1
1−αh
, (16)
where x¯h is as defined in Equation 15.
2. (Asset Class l) We now consider the targets’ and attackers’ new equilibrium:
if σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , for i ∈ {l, h}, and the targets’ objective is as specified in
Equation 12, then the equilibrium allocation bundle xl, z will be
x‡l = −
1
ψl
log(η¯αhh ) +
αl
ψl
(log(η¯αhh ) + log(β(e
δT − 1)η¯−αhh )− (17)
log(γδψl(e
βT − 1)L) + βT − δT ) + x¯hψh
z‡ =
βη¯−αhh e
x¯hψh+βT
Lψl(eβT − 1) , (18)
and the attacker intensity ηl is given by
η‡l =
(
z
(
eδT − 1) e−x‡lψl−δT
γδ
) 1
1−αl
. (19)
Proof. The proof of Parts 1 and 2 are given in Appendix A.3. Note that the stew-
ard’s choice is effectively determined by three variables Lˆ, ζ˜h, and β¯. We assume
that these are, a priori, in the steward’s information set. It is worth reiterating
that, at this stage, decisions regarding z, xl, and ηl are, by construction, not
included in this optimization. However, we do not have to impose these restric-
tions, as the derivative with respect to xh of the steward’s objective function,
given the multiplicative form of σ˜i = e
−ψixiηαii , for i ∈ {l, h}, does not include
xl and ηl. So, the only implicitly restricted information is replaced by Lˆ, ζ˜h. uunionsq
Note that we use the ‡ to denote this new equilibrium for the targets as it is
not strictly a Nash equilibrium solution, but rather is Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
in which the steward has prior values for Lˆ and ζ˜. See [7] for an explanation of
the difference between Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria.
2.6 Measuring Resilience
Measuring the impact of technological shocks to αi,i∈{l,h} and ψi,i∈{l,h} and
economic shocks to β¯, β, δ, L, and γ is a challenging task and requires the
creation of an arbitrary metric. In this paper, we combine the equilibrium values
of xi∈{l,h}, z, and ηi∈{l,h} using a total non-discounted loss function for the risk
component only. This is given as follows:
V˜A(v˜, u˜) =
T˜∫
t0
z˜σ˜l (x˜l, η˜l)L+ (1− z˜) σ˜h (x˜h, ηh)Ldt (20)
v˜ = (z˜, x˜i∈{l,h}, η˜i∈{l,h}) (21)
u˜ = (αi,i∈{l,h}, ψi,i∈{l,h}), (22)
where T˜ = − log(λ)/θ and θ = min(β¯, β, δ), for an arbitrary λ tending to zero.
By construction, Equation 20 gives an undiscounted loss function, so that the
value of the critical parameter T˜ , which represents the step-size of the periods
considered in the model (cf. Figure 2, for a multi-period sustainability model),
is finite. v˜ is the collection of choice variables under the various stewardship
options. u˜ is the collection of parameters that are subject to the technology
shocks under consideration.
For a single period, resilience will be measured by a response function to
shocks to the parameters u˜. Our choice of response function to technology shocks
allows for shocks across the set of parameters u˜ either simultaneously of individ-
ually. It is given by the numerical evaluation of the following ordinary differential
equation:
I˜(u˜) =
T˜∫
t0
∂z˜
∂u˜
σ˜l
(
∂x˜l
∂u˜
,
∂η˜l
∂u˜
)
L+
∂ (1− z˜)
∂u˜
σ˜h
(
∂x˜
∂u˜
,
∂η˜
∂u˜
)
Ldt, (23)
u˜ = {αi∈{l,h}, ψi∈{l,h}},
where each case has a set of functional forms for z˜, x˜i∈{l,h} and ηi∈{l,h}. We have
denoted the three cases as follows: v˜ = v∗ and u˜ = u∗ for the Nash equilibrium,
v˜ = v¯ and u˜ = u¯ for the fully informed steward and v˜ = v¯‡ and u˜ = u¯‡ for the
partially informed steward with minority action case.
We are interested in establishing the thresholds, illustrated in Figure 4, which
describe levels of system operating capacity, as measured by loss, for differing
degrees of stewart’s effectiveness. We attempt to establish whether the system
restores, through co-ordinated investment, to the target zone or not.
In our model, these thresholds reveal themselves as discontinuities, relative
to shock size, in the solutions to Equation 23, below. Such discontinuities can
be seen in our simulations as the asymptotes in Figures 6 and 8, for fully and
partially informed stewards.
Let V˜A(v
∗, u∗) and I˜(u∗) be, respectively, the total non-discounted loss for
the risk component under the Nash equilibrium and the corresponding collec-
tion of response functions. Similarly let V˜A(v¯, u¯), I˜(u¯) and V˜A(v¯
‡, u¯‡), I˜(u¯‡) be,
respectively, the same pair of functions and collection of functions for the fully
informed steward and the partially informed steward with minority action cases.
We can measure the effectiveness of the steward by comparing V˜A(v
∗, u∗)
to V˜A(v¯, u¯). We can also evaluate the erosion in risk reduction caused by re-
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stricting the stewards information set and action space by pairwise evaluation
of V˜A(v
∗, u∗) and V˜A(v¯, u¯) with V˜A(v¯‡, u¯‡).
To examine the impact of shocks and measure resilience we compare the
response functions I˜(u∗) and I(u¯) to evaluate the impact of the fully informed
steward. Finally, we can compare the resilience of the system when the stewards
information set is restricted by comparing I˜(u∗) and I(u¯) to I(u¯‡), for varying
sizes of shocks in u˜. In particular, we focus on αi∈{l,h}.
3 Application to ICS, SCADA, and Corporate Networks
Industrial control systems (ICS) are ubiquitous in most large industrial firms and
related organisations. A further common type of ICS are Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems are designed to auto-
matically or semi-automatically control industrial processes. Examples of such
systems can be found in petroleum exploration and processing, gas distribution,
bulk electricity transmission, various parts of the nuclear industry and most
manufacturing processes. Similar, or identical types of systems may be found
in defensive applications, such as automatic air defence systems. ICS/SCADA
systems are often very complex and deal with a large number of different types
of sensors and actuators affecting the various aspects of the system in ques-
tion. ICS/SCADA systems and the security of ICS/SCADA systems is not a
new topic however, when many of the ICS/SCADA systems were first installed
they were viewed as standalone assets and as such the major security concern
was physical access to the control system or by physically tapping directly into
the data acquisition sensors and/or the control communications to actuators.
For our purposes, this distinction between ICS and SCADA is not critical and
we refer generically to ICS/SCADA as a single type of assets within a target
organization.
Our main question centres on whether a firm would seek to adjust its declared
mix of ICS/SCADA and corporate information assets (we explicitly do not in-
clude physical assets in this example) to avoid costly regulation. We will assume
that there exists some legacy regulation of certain types of ICS/SCADA systems
and that firms can choose to replace some or all of the information architecture
of theses systems with analogous technologies run on an unregulated corporate
network. In terms of the model presented here, we have following set-up:
investments allocation risk-reduction rate attacker elasticity
ICS/SCADA xh 1− z ψh αh
Corporate xl z ψl αl
In this paper, we run simulations for this model in which we shock the αl;
that is, the elasticity of attacker intensity against assets in the corporate net-
work. Here we are modelling the situation in which we assume that the primary
source of vulnerability is associated with the corporate network because of its
more direct exposure to the Internet, with all of the associated vulnerabilities.
As ICS/SCADA systems are increasingly interconnected with corporate systems,
these vulnerabilities potentially affect core CNI systems; that is, the high-value
(h) assets. Clearly, Equation 23 allows for a wider variety of experiments, which
would allow us to explore different assumptions about the sources of vulnerabil-
ities.
In the US, 1,900 bulk power system operators are regulated by The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), a not-for-profit organization
with the role of coordinating the individual operators. This regulated ecosystem
— of interconnected organizations — provides us with some indicative param-
eters for our experiments. Each operator will have a ICS/SCADA system that
manages the bulk electricity transmission in their area. This will be a network of
communications that monitor the physical network of power cables, transform-
ers, and substations.
In addition to the ICS/SCADA assets, the various operators have corporate
networks that provide on-going information services for the normal business
activities for each operator. The corporate network has many of the same features
as the ICS/SCADA system and there are elements of substitutability between the
two. For instance, an operator could phase out using expensive fibre optic cables
to communicate between ICS/SCADA systems and substations and replace this
with a IP or 3G type communications.
A successful penetration of a corporate network that is integrated with an
ICS/SCADA now provides attackers with a potentially more effective means of
attacking the ICS/ SCADA system. The attacker can sit an learn the systems
properties via sampling and observation of the ICS/SCADA systems normal
operation and then use this information to either provide a priori information
to improve the chance of success of a physical attack or actually attack the
ICS/SCADA system directly through the corporate network.
As a community of targets, systematic underinvestment across all targets
leads to increased attacking intensity and this provides a negative externality
that requires coordination across targets in order to internalize this cost. We
will illustrate three cases for this example, first where targets are unregulated
and choose investment using the Nash equilibrium approach in § 2. We will
then demonstrate the improvement that can be achieved by the fully informed
steward. Finally, we will illustrate the deterioration in security when targets can
shift assets from the oversight of the steward and the steward can no longer
mandate investment. In each case, we illustrate the change in total risk with
shocks to attacker elasticities and why targets may find it attractive to move
assets from a regulated to an unregulated environment.
3.1 An Example Simulation
This simulation is designed to provide an overview of the intuition of our model
and is not supposed to provide specific quantification for our proposed applica-
tion. However, we have tried to stay close to real data when possible.
Let us assume that targets have a discount rate of 20% per annum (β =
log(6/5) continuous growth rate), in this case when λ = 10, the target time
overall horizon is T = 12.3 years. This appears to be a reasonable assumption
for the amortization of information assets within a firm see, for example, the
survey in [4]. For electricity transmission in the United States, the difference
between physical and information assets can be found in [12, 14].
We assume that the societal discount rate used by the steward is much lower
and ranges from β¯ → 0 to β¯ → 1/10. In [10], we outline the various debates on
the appropriate social discount factor to be applied in public policy scenarios.
For certain areas of public policy debate such as climate change discount rates
approaching zero a common for certain economic arguments relating to low car-
bon policies. For information stewardship the requirement is not so acute but
significant differences between firm discount rates and societal discount rates
remain.
For our starting numerical example, we assume that ψl = ψh; that is, the
relative marginal risk reduction from investment in both asset classes is identical
and fixed we assume that it is 1/100, 1/10 and 1/2, to represent low, medium
and high effectiveness bands. This is a more difficult assumption to justify as
there is very little literature on the efficacy of investment in security in this area,
therefore our simulation covers a wide range of reasonable bands.
We arbitrarily fix L = $1M, as an example, and divide all losses by L to give
a per-dollar-at-risk measure. Lˆ is assumed to be half L. Starting from the Nash
equilibrium assumption, if ψl = ψh, it follows that ζ˜ = 1/2.
We set the atackers’ discount rate to be δ = log(11/10), or a 10% discrete rate
of return. From the viewpoint of attackers, the discount rate is analogous to an
investment, as opposed to depreciation and amortization from the viewpoint of
the targets. The most difficult parameter to set in the simulation is γ, as almost
no data exists on the cost per attack to reward ratio. When γ → 0, the cost per
attack divided by reward indicates that either the rewards are very high or that
the cost per attack is very low. When γ = 0, attacking intensity is infinite. This
has not been observed, therefore we stick to finite values of γ = 1/10 or a 10%
cost-reward ratio. The shock of interest is that to the elasticity of attack αi∈{l,h}
and, in particular, shocks to αl.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the differing effects of shocks to the attacker elas-
ticities, in the presence of a fully informed steward. Recall that by increasing the
elasticity the attacker chances of success increase substantially, ceteris paribus.
However, the ecosystem will react to shocks to this elasticity, for the Nash
equilibrium in the absence of a steward this will simply be an adjustment to the
ratios illustrated in Proposition 1. However, for the fully informed steward there
is a reactive coordinating entity, balancing current period investment with future
uncertain losses. As shocks to the attacking elasticity αl increase, the steward
utilizes this collective component to reduce the attacking intensity (rather than
keeping the risk down by defensive effort xl). The derivative of ∂η¯l/∂x¯l is now
more important than ∂σ˜l/∂x¯l, where ηl is constant. The steward therefore finds
an optimum by driving away all the attackers (as even small numbers are now
very effective).
We see that, for all values of ψ, the fully informed steward provides a lower
total non-discounted loss than the Nash equilibrium. This illustrates the bene-
ficial effect of the steward. However, with larger values of ψ, the absolute effect
decreases. The major benefit of the steward is in suppressing and adjusting the
ecosystem to shocks and this effect is demonstrable for all three values of ψ.
Finally, we move to the partially informed steward with minority action, the
total non-discounted loss V˜A and response function I˜ for shocks in αl are plotted
in Figures 7 and 8. In this case, the pattern is similar to the Nash equilibrium
for small shocks. The targets, however have costly regulation in the h asset class
and are under investing in the l asset class. Unfortunately, in this case there
is a discontinuity at αl = 1, so the total loss spikes prior to the shift in assets
from l to h. This is a de facto boundary, as illustrated in Figure 4. We can see
that before the steward can regulate the assets, the total risk will traverse the
discontinuity, before the steward can actually manage the majority of assets that
the targets have not declared. Here, we can see a case of an ecosystem that is
not resilient and lies within the feasible boundaries of our example parameter
sets.
3.2 Robustness of the Modelling Assumptions
The various forms of the model that we have proposed assume that targets are
ex-ante identical. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption to lend tractability
to the derivation and illustration of the specific effects that we are attempting
to identify. However, this assumption is not as limiting as might be suspected.
The issue with the heterogeneity of the types of target — in terms of vul-
nerability or magnitude of loss — is that once we assume a steward in the role
of a policy-maker determining mandatory investments, this steward would nec-
essarily have to identify each target’s Pareto efficient investment. For a large
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Fig. 5. Steward’s total non-discounted loss function, V˜A, as a function of αl. An impor-
tant point to note is that this does not include the deterministic up-front investment,
so this curve can actually slope downwards, even with increasing αl. The upper curve
represents ψl = ψh = ψ = 0.01, the middle curve ψ = 0.1 and the lower curve is
ψ = 0.5. These values of ψ represent, respectively, low, medium, and high rates of risk
reduction for additional investment.
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Fig. 6. Steward’s response function, I˜(αl), as a function of an increasing shock in αl,
the abscissa values. Note that the steward now takes a positive action and seeks to
manage the direction of the shock, as αl becomes very large, the steward tolerates
almost no attacking intensity and this effect is illustrated by the change in sign of the
response.
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Fig. 7. Partially informed steward with minority action total non-discounted loss func-
tion V˜A as a function of αl. In this case, the targets maintain assets in the increasingly
risky l class to avoid ostly regulation in h, however a discontinuity exists at αl causing
the loss function to spike before the assets are shifted back to the regulated domain.
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Fig. 8. Partially informed steward with minority action response function I˜(αl) as a
function of an increasing shock in αl, the abscissa values. Note that after a shock of
αl → 1, the function I˜(αl) is not defined.
cross section of targets, this could potentially be a costly information-gathering
exercise.
Targets have the incentive to under-disclose their characteristics (e.g., be-
cause of budget pressures) and the remediation action of the steward is there-
fore rendered ineffective. A standard approach to this is contingent audit; see,
for example, early research in this area in [11, 2] and later work in [6, 5]. Targets
are asked to declare their characteristics — in terms of vulnerability and mag-
nitude of loss — by the steward. In the event of an incident, there is a chance of
audit (with known likelihood) and a large penalty (necessarily large enough for
incentive compatibility) for incorrect prior identification to the steward. If the
target has correctly identified their characteristics then no fine is levied. For the
types of model proposed in [13, 10], this approach would allow the steward to
coordinate and mandate investment allocations with targets declaring their own
vulnerability and loss characteristics. The allocation would therefore be Pareto
efficient from the viewpoint of the steward. However, the allocation will not nec-
essarily be Pareto efficient from the viewpoint of the target as the steward and
target time preferences may be divergent. This is further exaggerated when the
targets have the ability to hide assets from the steward. If the steward’s dis-
count rate is very low relative to the targets’ rates, then, under certain cases of
the model, targets will move their assets to the class labelled l, by decreasing
z substantially towards zero. This leaves very few assets in class h regulated by
the steward.
When shocks — to the elasticity of the technology of attack in class l denoted
αl, say — result in a higher level of viable attacking intensity in equilibrium,
targets can either choose to shift their assets to h by decreasing z or try to
cope with the increasing attacks in l. Unfortunately, the game between attackers
and targets in l results an equilibrium with externalities. Moreover, for certain
versions of the model, the total risk when the steward takes action without
observing xl and z may be substantially higher (by orders of magnitude) than
if the targets and attackers achieved a Nash equilibrium in the absence of the
steward. We have discussed this case in §3.
Several rationales can be put forward to explain why the common knowledge
assumption of z and xl might not be shared with the steward by the targets.
First, if β is much larger than β¯, then the targets do not share the sustainability
objectives of the steward, defined in terms of their time preferences (the targets
are far shorter term than the policy-maker), therefore the targets may make
a strategic choice, in an initial sub-game, to hide z and xl from the steward.
Second, an alternative explanation, that does not require another mechanism to
explain it, is that the targets and steward initially entered into a Stackelberg
arrangement that is binding to the steward (to accomplish some sustainability
target and internalize externalities in xh). The steward sets xh within the frame-
work of the original agreement and this optimization rule continues through the
life of the ecosystem, even when potentially new assets xl exist. Indeed, the stew-
ard may simply not have sufficient information processing power to supervise all
assets and then to cover them under relevant tort law liability conditions for
the targets self-revelation approach to work. If there are a very large number of
targets with highly diverse information assets, then the full audit may not be
possible. Clearly, the model assumes the types of organization in xl are ex-ante
homogeneous.
One can postulate a set of regulations (in the form of fixed rules) designed
by the steward and requiring the disclosure of targets’ assets such that the in-
vestment xh internalizes attacker externalities across targets (on the assumption
that this is the complete set of assets). However, after a time, new assets not
covered by the rules appear, or methods that allow targets to de-recognize these
assets from the steward may exist.
4 Summary
This paper will make grim reading for any governmental, supra-governmental
agency or firm that needs to act in a stewardship capacity over a complex in-
formation ecosystem. We illustrate two contrasting issues that complicate the
management of this type of ecosystem. First, for almost all conceivable target–
attacker interactions the presence of a steward is beneficial to overall risk re-
duction, by acting as a social coordinator and mandating investment that inter-
nalises externalities. Second, it is unlikely, however, that the time preferences of
the steward, acting on behalf of society, and the targets will be aligned and as
such the targets may not have the correct incentive to reveal their true type to
the steward. In our framework this is in the form of hiding assets in an alternative
unregulated asset class.
If the steward is able to observe these assets and mandate the majority of the
investment bundle then the steward can still perform a beneficial role. However,
when the steward acts on minority information and has limited action, the effect
can be far worse than the Nash equilibrium when the steward is not present.
Targets, maybe incentivized to store assets in increasingly insecure areas and
this can substantially degrade the resilience of the ecosystem.
We have also provided a short example of this model using parameters de-
signed to approximate the choice between holding information assets in a reg-
ulated ICS/SCADA system versus redeployment to a standard corporate in-
formation network. We demonstrate that a catastrophic scenario predicted by
the model solutions under certain parameter configurations is possible for the
domain of shocks assumed choices in this example.
Our major conclusions are also backed by qualitative analysis of the types
of contracts an regulations needed to ensure that the stewards information set
is sufficient to maintain the information ecosystem. It should be noted that
the types of regulatory structures needed, transparent mandatory information
sharing, audit in the event of an incident and penalties that compound when
prior information sharing has proven to be false, are not commonly observed in
the regulation of standard enterprise networks. However, for firms with assets of
significant importance or interaction with to the critical infrastructure of nations
and groups of nations this type of regulation may need to be commonplace.
This could include supply chains to infrastructure providers and cloud service
providers for very large groups of firms and individuals.
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A Nash Equilibrium
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: Equilibrium Target Investment Let σ˜i∈{l,h} : R+ → [0, 1]. Eval-
uating the non-stochastic integral of loss over t0 = 0 to T we find an analytic
form the loss function,
VL =
1
β
L
(
eβT − 1
)
e−xhψh−xlψl−βT
(
zexhψhη
αl
l − (z − 1)ηαhh exlψl
)
+ xh + xl. (24)
Differentiating with respect to x˜l, x˜h, and z˜ yields
δV˜L
δxl
= 1− 1
β
Lzψl
(
eβT − 1) ηαll e−xlψl−Tβ (25)
δV˜L
δxl
= 1− 1
β
L(1− z)ψh
(
eβT − 1) ηαhh e−xhψh−Tβ (26)
δV˜L
δz
=
1
β
L
(
eβT − 1) e−xhψh−xlψl−Tβ (exhψhηαll − ηαhh exlψl) . (27)
Setting δV˜L/δxl = 0, δV˜L/δxh = 0 and δV˜L/δz = 0, and solving simultaneously,
we derive the unconstrained optimal allocation (xl , x

h, z
). When attacking in-
tensity (ηl, ηh) is exogenous, this is analytically derived as
xl (ηl) =
1
ψl
log
(
(λ− 1)Lψhψlηαll
βλ (ψh + ψl)
)
(28)
xh(ηh) =
1
ψh
log
(
(λ− 1)Lψhψlηαhh
βλ (ψh + ψl)
)
(29)
z =
ψl
ψh + ψl
. (30)
Note that z is a simple ratio of ψh and ψl. In this model, we apply no total
budget constraint on xh and xl; that is, xh + xl = x, so no Lagrange multiplier
needs to be added at this stage.
Part 2: Equilibrium Attacker Intensity Following from the target decision-
making process, we derive the attacker intensity function. Attackers enter the
market for attacks in each asset class until they break even. When Πl = 0 and
Πh = 0, we assume that attackers are randomly assigned targets, with identical
probability 1/NT for each attack, and that the first successful attacker wins the
reward R.
Let γ = c/R, the cost of attack to reward. When σ˜i∈{l,h} : R+ → [0, 1], the
profit functions for the attacker are as follows:
Πl =
1
δ
zλ−
δ
β
(
λδ/β − 1
)
ηαl−1l e
−xlψl − γ (31)
Πh =
1
δ
(1− z)
(
λδ/β − 1
)
λ−
δ
β ηαh−1h e
−xhψh − γ. (32)
Solving each function for the break-even attacking intensities ηl (xl) and
ηh(xh), we compute the aggregate attacker reaction functions:
ηl (xl) =
(
zλ−
δ
β
(
λδ/β − 1) e−xlψl
γδ
) 1
1−αl
(33)
ηh(xh) =
(
(1− z)λ− δβ (λδ/β − 1) e−xhψh
γδ
) 1
1−αh
. (34)
The simultaneous Nash equilibrium is the best reply of the target to the best
reply of the attacker (and vice versa), which is the simultaneous solution of
{xl , xh, z, ηl , ηh}.
Setting the Nash equilibrium defensive allocation (targets) and attacking
intensity (attacker) as {x∗l , x∗h, z∗, η∗l , η∗h}, we obtain
x∗l =
αl
ψl
(
− log
(
γδLψhψl
(
eβT − 1
))
+ log
(
βψh
(
eδT − 1
))
+ βT − δT
)
+
1
ψl
log
(
Lψhψl
(
eβT − 1)
β (ψh + ψl)
)
− Tβ (35)
x∗h =
αh
ψh
(
− log
(
γδLψhψl
(
eβT − 1
))
+ log
(
βψl
(
eδT − 1
))
+ βT − δT
)
+
1
ψh
log
(
Lψhψl
(
eβT − 1)
β (ψh + ψl)
)
− Tβ (36)
η∗l =
(
β
(
eδT − 1) eαl(log(γδLψhψl(eβT−1))−log(βψh(eδT−1))+β(−T )+δT)+T (β−δ)
γδLψl (eβT − 1)
) 1
1−αl
(37)
η∗h =
(
β
(
eδT − 1) eT (β−δ)+αh(log(γδLψhψl(eβT−1))−log(βψl(−(eδT−1)))−βT+δT)
γδLψh (eβT − 1)
) 1
1−αh
,(38)
where z∗ = z. Assuming that αi∈{l,h} > 0, ψi∈{l,h} > 0, L > 0, T > 0, γ > 0,
δ > 0 and β > 0, then Equations 35 and 36 simplify to the result given in
Proposition 1 (Part 1) and Equations 37 and 38 simplify to the equations given
in Proposition 1 (Part 2). uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1: Target Investment with Steward For the fully informed steward,
setting x¯i∈{h,l} and z¯ the steward’s objective is to minimize total aggregate loss
for all targets. For our derivation, the targets are all assumed to be identical
therefore the steward seeks to minimize
V˜P = NT
T∫
t0
e−β¯t (zσ˜ (xl, ηl ) + (1− z) σ˜ (xh, ηh)) dt+NTxh +NTxl
where σ˜i∈{l,h} : R+ → [0, 1], ηi∈{l,h} is derived from Equations 33 and 34. The
asset allocation z does not have a tractable analytic solution in this case, so
for exposition purposes we focus on xl and xh when z is fixed. In this case, let
us fix z to the Nash equilibrium solution, therefore z¯ = z, from the proof in
Proposition 1 (Part 1). Evaluating the integral from t0 = 0 to T and eliminating
NT yields:
V˜P =
L
(
eβT − 1) e−xhψh−xlψl−βTψhexlψl
β (ψh + ψl)
(
ψh
(
eδT − 1) e−xhψh−Tδ
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) αh
1−αh
+
L
(
eβT − 1) e−xhψh−xlψl−βTψhexlψlψlexhψh
β (ψh + ψl)
(
ψl
(
eδT − 1) e−xlψl−δT
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) αl
1−αl
(39)
This is now a two-dimensional unconstrained optimization problem, where
∂V˜P
∂xl
=
Lψ2l
(
eβT − 1) e−xlψl−βT
β (αl − 1) (ψh + ψl)
(
ψl
(
eδT − 1) e−xlψl−δT
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) αl
1−αl
(40)
∂V˜P
∂xh
=
Lψ2h
(
eβT − 1) e−xhψh−βT
β (αh − 1) (ψh + ψl)
(
ψh
(
eδT − 1) e−xhψh−δT
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) αh
1−αh
. (41)
Setting ∂V˜P /∂xl = 0 and ∂V˜P /∂xh = 0 and solving for x¯l and x¯h, we obtain
the steward’s solution:
x¯l =
− (1− αl)
ψl
× (42)
log
 (1− αl)βγ− αlαl−1 δ− αlαl−1ψ 1αl−1−1l (ψh + ψl) 11−αl (eδT − 1) 1αl−1+1eβT− δαlαl−1T
L (eβT − 1)

x¯h =
− (1− αh)
ψh
× (43)
log
 (1− αh)βγ− αhαh−1 δ− αhαh−1ψ 1αh−1−1h (ψh + ψl) 11−αh (eδT − 1) 1αh−1+1eT(β− δαhαh−1)
L (eβT − 1)

Simplification of Equations 42 and 43 yields the solutions given in Proposition
2 (Part 1).
Part 2: Attacking Intensity The attacker intensities under the fully informed
steward are obtained by substituting the optimal expenditures x¯l and x¯h into
Equations 33 and 34; that is,
η¯l =
(
ψl
(
eδT − 1) eδ(−T )−x¯lψl
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) 1
1−αl
(44)
η¯h =
(
ψh
(
eδT − 1) eδ(−T )−x¯hψh
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) 1
1−αh
(45)
Setting i = {h, l} and j = {h, l} for j 6= i yields Equation 9 in Proposition 2
(Part 2). uunionsq
The analytic forms of Equations 44 and 45, as functions of the model param-
eters, are as follows:
η¯l =
(
ψle
δ(−T ) (eδT − 1)
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) 1
1−αl
× (46)
−β (αl − 1) γ− αlαl−1 δ− αlαl−1ψ 1αl−1−1l (ψh + ψl) 11−αl (eδT − 1) 1αl−1+1eT
(
β− δαl
αl−1
)
L (eβT − 1)

η¯h =
(
ψhe
δ(−T ) (eδT − 1)
γδ (ψh + ψl)
) 1
1−αh
× (47)
−β (αh − 1) γ− αhαh−1 δ− αhαh−1ψ 1αh−1−1h (ψh + ψl) 11−αh (eδT − 1) 1αh−1+1eT
(
β− δαh
αh−1
)
L (eβT − 1)
 .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The final case we consider in this paper considers the case when a steward can
only observe and mandate one of the elements of the investment allocation, xh.
The targets have discretion to signal a value Lˆ, however the steward does not
know the true value of L or z.
The attackers signal a value ζ˜, which we assume is actually 1 − z. Targets,
still have to choose their asset allocation, but they can potentially hide it from a
potentially costly investment allocation. For tractability, we will assume this is in
two steps, a signal of Lˆ and ζ˜ and then an adjustment. This is done for tractable
exposition, although the simultaneous model also has an analytic solution and
provides a similar result, whilst being algebraically more complex.
Part 1: Asset Class h Let σ˜i∈{l,h} : R+ → [0, 1] and, for the targets, let xh
be exogenous. Targets minimize
V˜T =
1
β
L
(
eβT − 1) e−xhψh−xlψl+β(−T ) (zexhψhηαll − (z − 1)ηαhh exlψl)+ xh + xl
(48)
Setting ∂V˜T /∂xl = 0 and ∂V˜T /∂z = 0 and solving for xl and z we obtain
xl =
xhψh − log
(
ηαhh η
−αl
l
)
ψl
(49)
z =
βeβT η−αll
Lψl
(
ηαhh η
−αl
l e
βT−xhψh − ηαhh e−xhψhη−αll
) (50)
Note that the both the optimal asset allocation z and the optimal investment
xl are now functions of xh and are both subject to an upper bound of η
∗
i <
eα
−1
i xiψi .
Part 2: Asset Class l The steward has received a information on Lˆ and ζ˜,
which in this derivation we treat as exogenous. However, the optimal initial bid
of Lˆ from the targets to the steward can be obtained by numerical analysis. The
steward sets a mandatory investment level of x¯h, from a restricted information
set by minimizing
V˜P =
NT
β¯
Lˆ
(
eβ¯T − 1
)
ηh
αhe−β¯T−xhψh +NTxh (51)
where
ηh =
(
ζ˜
(
eδT − 1) e−xhψh−δT
γδ
) 1
1−αh
(52)
solving the single equation and single unknown ∂VP /xh = 0, yields
x¯h =
1
ψh
log (A) + αh
ψh
(
T (β¯ − δ)− log (B))− β¯T
ψh
(53)
Note that xh is now a function of Lˆ, ζ˜ and the structural parameters δ, γ,
ψi∈{l,h}, αi∈{l,h} and T . Simplification of Equation 53 results in the steward
component of Proposition 4 (Part 1). Substitution of x¯h into Equation 52 pro-
vides the functional form of the attacker intensity η¯h of Proposition 4 (Part 1).
The solution in terms of the model parameters is as follows:
η¯h = B
1
1−αh eαh(log(−A)+T (δ−β¯)+T (β¯−δ))
1
1−αh
(54)
where
A = Lˆ
(
1− ebT )ψhγ 1αh−1+1δ 1αh−1+1ζ˜ αh1−αh (eδT − 1) αh1−αh
β¯ (αh − 1)
(55)
B = β¯ (1− αh) γ
1
1−αh−2δ
1
1−αh−2ζ˜
1
αh−1+2
(
eδT − 1) 1αh−1+2
Lˆ (ebT − 1)ψh
(56)
To derive the target allocation and attacker intensity η‡l , we now simply need
to substitute the functional forms of x¯h and η¯h into Equations 49 and 50 and
simplify functional forms in Proposition 4 (Part 2). For x‡l z
‡ and η‡l ,
x‡l =
1
ψl
αh(T (β¯ − δ)− log(A)) + log(A)− β¯T (57)
− 1
ψl
log
(β (eδT − 1) eT (β−δ)
γδLψl (eβT − 1)
)−αl (
eαh(log(A)−β¯T+δT )+T (β¯−δ)
) αh
1−αh

z‡ =
βA
Lψl (eβT − 1)e
T (β−β¯)−αh(log(A)+T (δ−β¯)) × (58)(
Beαh(log(A)+T (δ−β¯))+T (β¯−δ)
) −αh
1−αh
η‡l =
β
(
eδT − 1) eT (β−δ)
γδLψl (eβT − 1) (59)
which simplify to the equations in Proposition 4 (Part 2). uunionsq
